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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GALEN CHRJSTENSEN,

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
MACK A. MtJNNS, GREGORY C.
MARBLE, DfiE M. MARBLE, BOYD
MARBLE, RANDY MARBLE, and
CHERYL MARBLE,

CASE NO. 900233-CA

defendants/Appellants.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal arises from a Judgement entered against the
Defendants/Appellants in the First Judicial District Court in and
for Box Elder County, State of Utah.

The Judgment against the

Defendants/Appellants was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court
i

pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)(j) of Utah Code Ann. 1953 Amended and was
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to § 78-2-2(4)
Utah Code Ann.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the First Judicial
District Court in and for Box Elder County, State of Utah by the
Honorable F. L. Gunnell, District Court Judge, granting judgment
on

a

promissory

note

for

the

Plaintiff/Respondent,

Galen

Christens^n, against the Defendants/Appellants, Mack A. Munns,
Gregory C« Marble, Dee M. Marble, Boyd Marble, Randy Marble and
Cheryl Marble.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether

the

trial

Judge

correctly

ruled

that

the

promissory note provided for compound interest.
2.

Whether

Plaintiff/Respondent•s

attorney's

statements

under oath supporting his hours for attorney fees was sufficient
to award attorney fees.
3.

Whether the delivery and use of the trailer by the

Plaintiff/Respondent was enough consideration for the promissory
note and whether consideration was in fact necessary to enforce the
promissory note.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-104(1):
"Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this
chapter must:
a.
b.

c.
d.

be signed by the maker or drawer; and
contain an unconditional promise or order
to pay a sum certain in money and no
other promise, order, obligation or power
given by the maker or drawer except as
authorized by this chapter; and
be payable on demand or on a definite
time; and
be payable to orderer or to bearer."

STATEMENT OF CASE
The Plaintiff/Respondent, Galen Christensen, filed a lawsuit
in the First Judicial District Court in and for Box Elder County,
State of Utah to collect $8,200.00 which Defendants/Appellants
agreed to pay pursuant to a promissory note that was signed on
March 26, 1981.

A non-jury trial was held and the Honorable F. L.

Gunnell, District Court Judge, rendered judgment in favor of the
-2-

Plaintiff/Respondent in the amount of $5,194.93, plus attorney fees
of $800.00, filing

fees of $75.00 for a total judgment of

$6,069.93.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 26, 1981, the Plaintiff/Respondent entered into a
contract with the Defendants/Appellants for the sale of a 1978
Fruehauf Semi-Trailer

(T.8).

The terms of the contract, as

witnessed by a promissory note, were that the Defendants/Appellants
were to pay the Plaintiff/Respondent a total of $12,200.00 (T.10).
Defendants/Appellants were to pay $4,000,000 as a down payment,
$3,000.00 on August 15, 1981 and the balance due, plus interest,
on October 15, 1981 (T.10).

I

plus three percent

(3%)

Interest was to be computed at prime
(T.ll).

Defendants/Appellants

paid

$4,000.00 down on March 26, 1981, $3,000.00 on September 4, 1981,
$1,500.00 on July 27, 1983, $1,500.00 on October 12, 1983, and
$1,153.60 on July 12, 1984 (T.ll). The 1978 Fruehauf Semi-Trailer
was delivered to Defendants/Appellants by Plaintiff/Respondent on
receipt of the down payment and signing of the promissory note on

I
March 26, 1981 (T.8).

Since July 12, 1984, Defendants/Appellants

have failed to make any additional payments as agreed to under the
terms of the promissory note

(T.ll.).

Further, one of the

Defendants/Appellants, Boyd F. Marble, testified that he did not
expect the title until the parties came to some type of final
agreement (T.4 3).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial Judge was correct in his factual findings that
compound interest is allowed in this case.

The parties signed a

promissory note that stated interest would be due on a day certain,
to wit, October 15, 1981.

Case law provides that if a person

promises to pay interest at a certain time then compound interest
is proper.
The Plaintiff/Respondent delivered the 1978 Fruehauf SemiTrailer to the Defendants/Appellants on the day the promissory note
was signed and their use of the trailer from 1981 forward is
sufficient consideration for the promissory note.
law

clearly

states

that

no

consideration

is

Further, Utah
necessary

for

enforcement of a negotiable instrument such as a promissory note.
Last, the Judge was correct in awarding attorney fees, the
Defendants/Appellants have not met their burden of proof on appeal
to overturn the awarding of attorney fees.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN INCLUDING COMPOUND INTEREST
IN ITS JUDGMENT.
The Defendant's/Appellant's main point on appeal is that the
trial Court was wrong in awarding compound interest.

It is true

that the courts have not generally favored an award of compound
interest unless the written documents clearly provide for it.
However, in the present case there is no question but that the
promissory note specifically allowed for compound interest.
-4-

The

interest on the promissory note was to be paid at a date certain,
October 15, 1981 (T.10) . Due to the fact that the interest was not
paid on that date, the Plaintiff/Respondent is entitled to collect
interest on the monies he did not receive including the interest
due October 15, 1981Before delving further into the specifics of the argument, the
Plaintiff/Respondent would respectfully point out to the Court that
the trial court entered a Finding of Facto

The Finding of Fact was

that the parties agreed to compound interest, the exact terms of
which were to be worked out by the parties * In order to challenge
the trial courtfs Finding of Fact, the Defendants/Appellants must
demonstrate that despite the Court's ruling and the evidence, its
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear
weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous.

See

Bartell 776 P.2d 885, 886 (1989).
There is no showing of the evidence in Defendant's/Appellant!s
brief to show that the trial court was erroneous. On the contrary,
the trial

court was right.

In a recent Utah

Supreme

Court

decision, one of the issues brought up on appeal was whether or not
compound

interest was proper.

The decision

allowed

compound

interest when there is a promise to pay interest at a particular
time.

The Court, in their decision

(See Watkins and Faber v.

Whiteley 592 P.2d 613, 616, [Utah 1979]) stated:
"The Plaintiff relies upon the case of Jensen v.
Lichtenstein as authority for permitting compound
interest. That case is not a point. There the Defendant
promised to pay interest at specified times and this
court held that when the specified date arrived there was
a new debt, to wit, the promised interest in additional
-5-

to the original debt. In the instant matter there was
no promise to pay interest at a particular time (616)."
(emphasis added)
Thus, the Supreme Court makes it very clear that where the
Defendant promised to pay interest at a specified time, the court
will allow compound interest.
Plaintiff/Respondent
promissory note.

and

The case is right in point.

Defendants/Appellants

into

a

The promissory note specifically provided that

all interest would be due on October 15, 1981.
paid.

entered

The

No interest was

Therefore, the Plaintiff/Respondent is entitled to receive

interest on his interest.

The fact that the Defendants/Appellants

promised to pay interest on October 15, 1981, created a new debt.
Because interest was not paid and as stated by the Court, the
Plaintiff/Respondent

is

entitled

to

receive

interest

on

his

interest.
There is another Supreme Court case that also speaks about
compound interest.

In Farnsworth v. Jenson 217 P. 2d 571 (Utah

1950) the Court stated:
"This brings us to the method of computing the interest.
The provision in the contract provided for the payment
of interest at the rate of 6% per annum for each yearly
payment was to include the amount of this interest.
Accordingly, there became due annually from the
Respondents the sum of $312.00 as interest. We believe
the rule announced in Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 Utah
320, 145 P. 1036, 1041, is controlling. In that case,
Mr. Justice Frick, speaking for the Court, disposed of
the computation of interest in the following language:
""Defendant1 s have promised to pay the
interest quarterly. Thus fell due at the end
of each quarter, the sum of $175,00 as
interest.
This amount was owing from
Defendants to the Plaintiff at the end of each
quarter after the 6th day of December, 1910,
when the last interest was paid as found by
-6-

the court. If Defendants had paid Plaintiff
the interest when due, he could have re-loaned
it to them or he could have loaned it to
anyone else, and then could have contracted
for any rate of interest not exceeding 12% per
annum. . . .""
The Plaintiff, therefore, was as much entitled to
interest upon the unpaid interest as though it had been
paid to him when due and he had re-loaned it* . . ."
Thus, it is very clear from Utah law that when a party states a day
certain when the interest is due, they are entitled to interest
from that day forward.

The Defendants/Appellants promised to pay

the balance of the contract plus interest on October 15, 1981. The
Defendants/Appellants failed to meet that obligation.

Due to the

fact that Defendants/Appellants failed to meet that obligation, the
Plaintiff/Respondent is entitled to interest on that interest or,
in other words, compound interest from that day forward.
POINT II
THE
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT
DID
NOT
NEED
TO
HAVE
CONSIDERATION TO SUPPORT THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE
PROMISSORY NOTE, HOWEVER, PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT DID
DELIVER THE TRAILER TO THE DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS FOR
THEIR USE WHICH WOULD BE AMPLE CONSIDERATION.
The

Plaintiff/Respondent

argues

in

his

brief

that

Defendants/Appellants refused to provide any consideration.

the
Utah

law, more specifically the Uniform Commercial Code, specifically
states that no consideration is necessary to enforce a promissory
note.

Section 78-3-104(1) states:
"Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this
chapter must:
a.
b.

be signed by^ the maker or drawer; and
contain an unconditional promise or order
to pay a sum certain in money and no
-7-

c.
d.

other promise, order, obligation or power
given by the maker or drawer except as
authorized by this chapter; and
be payable on demand or on a definite
time; and
be payable to orderer or to bearer."

Thus, it is clear under Utah law that a negotiable instrument needs
to meet four requirements•
a, b, c, and d above.

The four requirements are outlined as
There is nothing about consideration.

Defendants/Appellants argument that no consideration was tendered,
first of all, is without merit on the basis that no consideration
is needed.
However, if the court finds that consideration was needed, it
is clear that consideration was in fact given.

Black's Law

Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition 1968 defines consideration as:
"Any benefit conferred, or agreed to be conferred, upon
the promisor, by any other person, to which the promisor
is not lawfully entitled. . ."
The Defendants/Appellants received a 1978 Fruehauf SemiTrailer. They were not legally entitled to the trailer. The fact
that they took the trailer on March 26, 1981 (T.8), when they had
no legal right to the trailer and were not lawfully entitled to the
trailer is enough to support the fact that consideration was given.
POINT III
THE JUDGE'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES WAS PROPER UNDER
THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
The Defendants/Appellants raise the issue that attorney fees
were not based on sufficient evidence.

The attorney for the

Plaintiff/Respondent called himself as a witness and testified as
to

attorney

fees

(T.23).

Further,
-8-

the

allegation

by

the

Defendants/Appellants simply stating that attorney fees are not
supported by the evidence is not sufficient. There is no reference
to case law or statutory law or any basis for the objection.

It

is a well established principle of law in this court and other Utah
courts that a review of the evidence by an appellant court is
construed so that any review or any inferences from a review is
done in the light most favorable to the finder of fact.
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985).

State v.

Further, the courts have

repeatedly stated that a judgment cannot and will not be reversed
unless the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds have entertained a reasonable doubt.
v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443f 444 (Utah 1983).
burden

and

standard

of

law,

makes

State

Keeping in mind this
it

clear

that

the

Defendants/Appellants have not met their burden. The attorney for
the Plaintiff/Respondent testified under oath as to what he charged
in the matter. He testified and requested more than what the Judge
awarded.

The Judge is the trier of the facts and he makes the

decision as to whether or not those services are reasonable based
on the testimony presented to him. The Judge decided to award less
attorney fees than requested. The Judge, based on the facts, made
his decision and no evidence or authority has been sided to
contradict that finding.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiff/Respondent respectfully
requests this Court to affirm the lower Court's judgment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

I

day of November, 1990,

VANDERLI

fEN C. VANEMERLIN&EN
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
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